Narendra Modi, Indian Prime Minister
Iran war tests India’s multi-alignment diplomacy
New Delhi is proud of its carefully balanced ties with rival nations in the Middle East. But this diplomatic strategy might be reaching its breaking point.
India has long taken pride in doing what few major powers could manage. It bought oil from Iran, built defense ties with Israel, strengthened relations with the US and expanded economic links with the Gulf monarchies, while insisting it would not be drawn into regional camps or formal alliances.
The Iran war, however, is pushing that formula to its limits. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems to be feeling the pressure — he is set to embark on a diplomatic tour on Friday that will see him visit the United Arab Emirates and four European countries in seven days.
For New Delhi, the Iran conflict is more than an energy crisis unfolding in a distant region. It is a direct challenge to the core assumption behind India’s foreign policy in the Middle East, namely that it can maintain its own strategic autonomy while cultivating ties with every major power in the region, irrespective of their rivalries.
Amitabh Mattoo, dean of the School of International Studies at Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University, says India spent decades perfecting a balancing act that was rooted in “hard-headed realism.”
“But the Iran conflict has made the geometry far more unforgiving. Strategic autonomy works best in a fluid multipolar order,” Mattoo told DW.
“It becomes harder when rival camps demand political loyalty, sanctions compliance, and security alignment all at once,” he added.
Mattoo is clear, however, about what breaks first when the pressure peaks.
“If push comes to shove, India’s first instinct will always be to protect economic stability and energy security. No government in New Delhi can afford prolonged oil shocks, shipping disruptions in Hormuz, or domestic inflation spirals,” he said.
But he stops short of labeling such moves as a rupture with Washington or Tel Aviv.
“The US is indispensable for India’s larger strategic future: technology, defense, Indo-Pacific balancing, and access to global capital. Israel remains a critical defense and intelligence partner. The Gulf is central to energy, remittances, and diaspora stability. Iran matters for geography and continental access,” Mattoo said.
What the crisis has exposed, in his assessment, is something larger than a policy dilemma.
“India is no longer a bystander in West Asia. Its dependence on the region means every escalation there now directly tests India’s great-power ambitions. Strategic autonomy is no longer a slogan. It is a stress test,” he said.
The paradox, as he frames it, is built into India’s own success.
“New Delhi wants strategic autonomy, but the deeper its global integration becomes, the harder it is to remain geopolitically non-aligned in moments of major conflict. Neutrality in a polarized West Asia is becoming less a position and more a luxury,” said Mattoo.
Not everyone accepts that the doctrine is under terminal strain. T S Tirumurti, a retired diplomat and India’s first representative to the Palestinian Authority, argues the Iran war is, in fact, an argument for New Delhi to keep the present course.
“So far, our policy of multi-alignment, including in West Asia, has stood us in good stead and expanded the scope for independent decision-making and for navigating regional fault lines.
It is only when we deviate from multi-alignment and try to veer to one side or another that our strategic space is constricted,” Tirumurti told DW.
He also rejects the idea that India faces a binary choice between energy security and strategic partnerships.
“We have in fact navigated between such issues in the recent past and managed to secure our energy supplies as well as keep our good relations with Israel and the US.
Recent history bears out the sagacity of India’s decisions on energy security,” he said.
India’s ability to sustain that balancing strategy depends on more than diplomatic skill. It is also a matter of economic resilience, and the costs of a prolonged regional conflict are becoming harder for New Delhi to absorb.
The Gulf nations supply a major share of India’s crude oil and natural gas. More than nine million Indians live and work across Gulf states, and their remittances are deeply tied to India’s domestic economy.
The Strait of Hormuz remains the clearest pressure point. Even the possibility of disruption sends shockwaves through India’s import calculations, insurance costs, inflation and financial stability.
New Delhi has responded by diversifying suppliers and deploying the Indian Navy to protect commercial shipping, but neither response comes cheaply.
However, while India’s strategic petroleum reserves may absorb temporary shocks, they are not set up for a prolonged Gulf conflict.
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